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NOTES AND COMMENT
Annual Meetings at the Canyon in Yellowstone during the period
of the Regional Meeting. The Montana Bar expects to dispose of
most of its association business on Tuesday, June 17th.
Committees are being activated in publicity, transportation,
reception, registration, entertainment and Junior Bar Confer-
ence matters. In the January issue of the American Bar Asso-
ciation Journal the Regional Meetings at Louisville and Yellow-
stone have been publicized and it is stated that the meetings
will sparkle with timely and useful institutes and entertainment
for the lawyers and their ladies; and that Judge Harold R.
Medina, Chairman of the Section of Judicial Administration, has
assured both Regional Directors that there will be a fine program
on minimum standards of judicial administration. Each morn-
ing will feature a world affairs program.
All law students and all lawyers, regardless of membership
in the American Bar Association, are urged to attend the Re-
gional Meeting. There will be a registration fee of $5.00 for
members of the bar, and $1.00 for law students.
The Regional Meeting will have exclusive occupancy of Can-
yon Hotel and Canyon Lodge. Any overflow will be accom-
modated at Lake. Full information regarding rates and accom-
modations can be obtained from Mr. Jameson.
Other officers chosen at the last Montana Bar Association
meeting are: Howard J. Luxan, Secretary; James T. Finlen,
James H. Morrow, Jr., Fred L. Gibson, George J. Hutton, and
Julius J. Wuerthner, Executive Committee.
MONTANA MUNICIPALITIES: LOCAL SELF
GOVERNMENT
The doctrine that municipal corporations' have a right to
govern their strictly municipal affairs has had a long and con-
troversial history in the United States, stemming from Judge
Cooley's opinion in the famed Michigan case of People v. Hurl-
"Public corporations consist of true municipal corporations and quari
municipal corporations. Qua8 municipal corporations have some of
the attributes of municipal corporations but lack some of the more im-
portant municipal characteristics, such as a concentration of popula-
tion in a small area and the power to pass local legislation, and are
formed almost exclusively with a view to the local administration of
state policy. Counties, school districts, drainage districts, etc., fall
within the term of quasi municipal corporations. Local self govern-
ment, if it applies at all, applies only to true municipal corporations.
State ex rel. Lambert v. Coad, 23 Mont. 131, 57 P. 1092 (1899) ; Inde-
pendent Publishing Company v. County of Lewis & Clark, 30 Mont. 83,
75 P. 860 (1904) ; Yellowstone County v. First Trust & Savings Bank,
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but.! The controversy has been over the legal soundness of the
doctrine rather than over the desirability of giving municipalities
a free rein in the management of their local affairs. In fact,
most writers and judicial authorities concede that municipal self
government is very desirable. Some even go so far as to say
that a vigorous and independent system of municipal govern-
ment is the strength and foundation of American democracy;
that it is the basic training place, so to speak, for democratic
thought, and that only in municipal affairs does the common
citizen have an opportunity to participate in government."
McQuillin lists as advantages flowing from municipal self
government: (1) that each community is free to select the form
of government which best suits its needs; (2) that the inhabitants
become educated in the principles of municipal government;
(3) that unhampered local control is better adapted to meet
fresh municipal problems; (4) that the state legislature is re-
lieved of a myriad of detailed municipal legislation, and thus
avoids conflict and uncertainty in municipal affairs; (5) that a
simple and scientific government is provided for at once which
is not subject to change at the whim of zealous political and
economic interests; and (6) that the temptation to interfere with
municipalities for reasons of party politics, spoils, or corruption
is removed from the legislature.' Much of what Mr. McQuillin
and the other writers say is no doubt true; and many states, in
recognition of the desirability of local self government, have
adopted constitutional amendments giving municipal corpora-
tions the right of local self government
A big storm has raged, however, over the assertion by some
authorities that local self government is a right existing in mu-
46 Mont. 439, 128 P. 596 (1912); Hersey v. Nielson, 47 Mont. 132, 131
P. 30 (1900) ; Edwards v. County of Lewis & Clark, 53 Mont. 359, 165
P. 297 (1917) ; Sullivan v. Bighorn County, 66 Mont. 45, 212 P. 1105
(1923); Frank v. Fergus County, 76 Mont. 150, 245 P. 962 (1926);
Lewis v. Petroleum County, 92 Mont. 563, 17 P. (2d) 60 (1932) ; DILmwN
MUN. CORPS. § 35 (4th ed.); 1 McQUILLIN MUN. CoRPs. §§ 126-136.(2d ed.).
224 Mich. 44,9 Am. Rep. 103 (1871).
8People v. Hurlbut supra, note 2; People v. Albertson, 55 N. Y. 50(1873) ; Attorney General v. Detroit, 58 Mich. 213 (1885) ; State v.
Denny, 118 Ind. 382, 402, 449, 21 N.E. 274, 4 L.R.A. 65, 24 Am. & Eng.
Corp. Cas., 223 (1889) ; Markley v. Mineral City, 58 Ohio St. 430, 440,
51 N.E. 28, 65 Am. St. Rep.'776 (1898) ; De Tocqueville's DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA ch. 5; 1 McQurTN MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS pp. 264-266
(2d ed.).
'1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS p. 277 (2d ed.).5McQuiLLi lists sixteen states 1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 162; (2d
ed.) ; a later writer finds two more, Harvey Walker in Let (iWe8 Man-
age TheMaelves, NAT. MUN. REv., Dec. 1947, p. 625.
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nicipal corporations independently of express provisions there-
for in the written constitutions of the respective states. That
issue will be the primary interest of this paper, with particular
emphasis on the question in Montana. It is well to state here
that there are really two theories offered in support of local self
government: (1) that self government of strictly local affairs
is a right which was reserved in the people when they granted to
the states their constitutional powers,' and (2) that municipal
corporations are protected as private corporations in the man-
agement of their proprietary or private affairs by the due pro-
cess clauses of the state constitutions.' The two theories are en-
tirely different but are not always recognized or distinguished
by the cases.
The extent of local self government will vary depending
upon which theory is used. If we were to find that self govern-
ment in strictly local affairs is a right reserved in the people,
then logically it would extend to all local affairs, both proprietary
and governmental, so long as the state as a whole has no interest.
And that is what the cases which purport to follow the reserved
right theory say.8 If, on the other hand, we find that municipal
corporations are to be treated as private corporations under the
due process clauses of the constitutions, then necessarily, as
private legal entities, they can have no autonomy in govern-
mental affairs. Local self government under the latter theory
must be limited to those local affairs denominated as proprietary
or private. Moreover, if the people of the state reserved out of
the constitution the right to local self government with respect
to strictly local affairs, then municipalities would themselves be
sovereign in these matters. The state could never presume to
interfere by imposing the least duty or regulation on the con-
duct of such affairs. On the other hand, if we find municipal
corporations to be agents of the state in all governmental mat-
ters and matters of general concern, and to be private corpora-
tions in their conduct of local proprietary matters, entirely dif-
ferent results will follow. As the principal, the state may restrict
the authority of its agents in any manner it wishes, except as
limited by specific constitutional provisions. And, as the sover-
eign, the state may impose any reasonable duty and regulation
062 C.J.S. Mu. Corps. § 184; 12 C.J. Const. Law § 174; 43 C.J. Mun.
Corps. § 289.
'62 C.J.S. Mun. Corps. § 110; 43 C.J. Mun. Corps. § 178.
"People v. Hurlbut supra, note 2; People v. Albertson supra, note 3;
State v. Denny supra, note 3; Bartlaville Water Company v. Brann, 166
Okla. 251, 27 P. (2d) 345 (1933).
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upon municipalities that it may impose on any private corpora-
tion. The only limitation upon the state is that it cannot deprive
the municipalities of property without due process of law. Since
the theories and the results are so different, each will be dis-
cussed separately below.
The reasoning of the first theory stated above, hereinafter
referred to as the "reserved right theory," is that, since mu-
nicipal self government existed and was recognized in the bor-
roughs of England and the colonial towns prior to the existence
of any of the state constitutions, and since it is so fundamental
to American democracy, it is a basic right of the people which
is reserved in them under the hypothesis that written constitu-
tions are grants of power to the state.'
The defect in the argument is in the misconception of the
republican theory of the origin and nature of the state constitu-
tions--more particularly in the misconception of constitutions as
grants of power from the people who are taken to be the ultimate
sovereign. The theory behind our constitutional form of govern-
ment, and the theory demanded by the United States Constitu-
tion,' is that the states are republics, which Webster's New In-
ternational Dictionary defines as: "a state in which the sover-
eign power resides in a certain body of the people (the electorate)
and is exercised by representatives elected by and responsible to
them." (Italics supplied.) Judge Cooley himself accepts this
theory,' and the whole idea of Rousseau's theory of a social con-
tract between man and the state, upon which our democratic
form of government rests, is that, except for contrary provisions
in the state constitutions, the general will of the people should
prevail.' Thus, "the people'"-the ultimate sovereign-does not
refer to individual persons, to classes of people, or to commu-
nities of people; it refers to the general will of the electorate.'
Therefore, a republican form of government being a wielding of
sovereignty by the agents of the people, the conclusion must fol-
low that the constitution is a limitation placed upon those agents.
Judge Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations," quotes
'9C. Montana Constitution Art. III, §§ 1, 2. People v. Hurlbut 8upra,
note 1 (at 24 Mich. pp. 96-99) ; State v. Denny &upra, note 3; 62 C.J.S.
Mun. Corp8. § 184; 43 C.J. Mun. Corp8. 289.
'U. S. Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 4.
"The point was conceded to be the generally prevailing view in Cooley's
opinion in People v. Hurlbut 8upra, note 2.
"Ebenstein MAN AND THE STATE, p. 21, quoting Jean Jacques Rousseau,
The Social Contract (1762), Everyman's Library Edition.
"BLACK CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 30 (3d ed.), ROTPSCHAEFFER CoNSTrrU-
TIONAL LAW, p. 165.
u(8th ed. 1927) Vol. 1, p. 96.
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with approval the case of Hamilton v. St. Louis County Court'
for this proposition:
"A written constitution is in every instance a limitation
upon the powers of government in the hands of agents;
for there never was a written republican constitution
which delegated to functionaries all of the latent powers
which lie dormant in every nation and are boundless in
extent and incapable of definition."
Montana also subscribes to this theory of the constitution
as a limitation on power. In the case of McClintock v. Great
:plus u.noo oiq t 's~pd
"Generally speaking our Constitution is not a grant of
powers but a limitation upon the powers which may be
exercised by the various branches of state government
.... Except in so far as it is restricted by the constitu-
tion, the Legislature has all the law making power pos-
sessed by any sovereign state. "
We must grant that the sovereign power is in the people-in
the electorate; but the people, under the social contract theory of
the state, did not grant away a few paltry rights and powers to
their agent, the government. Rather, they granted all their
rights and powers, limited only by the provisions of the par-
ticular state constitution. Any idea that a right of local self
government is reserved in the people because it was not granted
away must fall at once when this proposition becomes clear.
Moreover, if municipalities were "little republics" with re-
spect to all strictly local affairs, they could not be subjected to
suit for acts done in connection with their proprietary affairs,
as they commonly are.' Nor would they be subject to regulations
laid down by administrative bodies such as public service com-
missions, as they commonly are." Indeed, how could the states'
courts ever take jurisdiction of another "sovereign," as they
commonly do. The absurdities to which the reserved right theory
leads point up its untenable position.
The fact is that many of the cases which purport to find
such a reserved right theory actually go off on some express
"15 Mo. 13 (1851).
"53 Mont. 221, 163 P. 99 (1921).
"Citing State v. Sullivan, 48 Mont. 320, 137 P. 392 (1913) ; State v. Dodd,
51 Mont. 100, 149 P. 481 (1915).
'Infra, note 40.
"Public Service Commission v. City of Helena, infra, note 32; McQunLuN
MUN. CoRrs. §§ 249-252 (2d ed.).
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constitutional limitation or statute.' Even the leading author-
ity for the theory, Judge Cooley's opinion in People v. Hurlbut,
is found to be only dictum in one of four Judges' opinions and
hence not even strong dictum. After discussing the existence of
a reserved right to local self government, Judge Cooley said:
"But I think that so far as is important to the decision of this
case there is an express recognition of the right of local author-
ity by the constitution." He then proceeded to find invalid
the legislative interference complained of" by construing an ex-
press constitutional provision in the light of the local self gov-
ernment which existed when the constitution was framed, and
concluded that as a matter of construction the framers must have
intended by that constitutional provision to protect local self
government. It is this latter proposition which he reaffirmed
in People v. Detroit' where he said, speaking of the Hurlbut case,
". . and what we said in that case we here repeat, that while
it is a fundamental principle in this State, recognized and perpe-
tuated by express provisions of the constitution, that the people
of every hamlet, city, or town of this State are entitled to the
benefits of local self government ... the precise extent ... has
been left to be determined by the legislature." (Emphasis sup-
plied.) And in his work on Constitutional Limitations he asserts
this principle of constitutional construction and not that of a
reserved right.
Although the Montana Supreme Court has in several cases
cited those parts of Cooley's opinions in the Hurlbut and Detroit
cases, supra, which seem to support a reserved right theory, there
will be found not one case decided upon that basis. The case of
Helena Consolidated Water Company v. Steele,' the first con-
sidering the theory in Montana, quoted from those Michigan
cases passages which support this and the private corporation
theory, but the actual decision was rested on express constitu-
"Brown v. Galveston, 97 Tex. 1, 75 S.W. 488 (1903), speaking of the
Hurlbut case and cases cited; 43 C.J. Mun Corps. § 289 n. 26, 27; 62
C.J.S. Mun. Corps. § 184 n. 96, 97; 19 R.C.L. Mun. Corps. § 35.
"Supra, note 2.
'24 Mich. 108.
"The Michigan legislature attempted to appoint the members of boards
of city water and sewer commissioners. 3 SussioN LAWS (Mich. 1871)
p. 273.
"Michigan Constitution, Art. 15, § 14: "Judicial officers of cities and
villages shall be elected and all other officers shall be elected or ap-
pointed at such time and in such manner as the legislature shall direct."
(Emphasis supplied.)
"28 Mich. 228, 15 Am. Rep. 202 (1873).
"(8th ed. 1927) pp. 389, 391.
'20 Mont. 1, 49 P. 382, 37 L.R.A. 412 (1897).
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tional limitations against legislative taxation for municipal pur-
poses" and against imposing any new liability on any county or
municipal corporation with respect to past transactions.' And a
later case, Gerry v. Edwards,' also citing the Hurlbut and De-
troit eases and citing the Helena Consolidated Water Company
case, was also decided on one of the same limitations.' Several
later cases purported to affirm this reserved right theory but
were not faced with the question." To repeat, the Montana
Supreme Court has yet to decide a case upon the basis of this
theory.
The second more limited but sounder theory of local self
government, hereinafter termed the "private corporation
theory," merely applies the principle that a state constitution
must be construed in the light of conditions which existed when
the constitution was framed and with a view to what the framers
intended. The doctrine is this: that municipal corporations are
more than mere political subdivisions of the state; that they have
proprietary or private functions, in addition to governmental
functions as political subdivisions or agents of the state, and that
as to proprietary or private functions they have as much right
to self control or management as have private corporations; and
that this right is protected by the due process clauses of the state
constitutions.
It must be conceded that such functions as supplying water,'
electricity," and steam heat' to its inhabitants, ownership and
management of municipal property,' operation of municipal
swimming pools," maintenance of parks,' etc.,' do not come
"Montana Constitution, Art. XII, § 4.
"Montana Constitution, Art. XV, § 13.
"42 Mont. 135, 111 P. 734, 100 A.L.R. 581 (1910).
"Supra, note 28.
"Hersey v. Nielson upra note 1; Stange v. Esval, 67 Mont. 301, 215 P.
807 (1923) ; State en rel. Woare v. Bd. of Commissioners of Liberty
County, 70 Mont. 252, 225 P. 389 (1924) ; Public Service Comm. v. Hel-
ena, 52 Mont. 527, 159 P. 24 (1916) ; Griffith v. City of Butte, 72 Mont.
552, 234 P. 829 (1924) ; Campbell v. Helena, 92 Mont. 366, 16 P. (2d) 1
(1932).
"Public Service Comm. of Montana v. Helena supra, note 32.
"Millegan v. Miles City, 51 Mont. 374, 153 P. 276 (1915).
"Millegan v. Miles City 8upra, note 34.
"State v. Holmes, 100 Mont. 256, 47 P. (2d) 624, 100 A.L.R. 581 (1935).
"Felton v. City of Great Falls, 118 Mont. 586, 169 P. (2d) 229 (1946).
"State en rel. Gerry v. Edwards supra, note 30.
"The city as an employer of firemen was said to be acting in a proprie-
tary capacity, even though fire protection itself was said to be a func-
tion of the sovereign. State ex rel. Kern v. Arnold infra, note 48. But
in State em rel. Gebhardt v. Helena, 102 Mont. 347, 90 P. (2d) 330
(1936), the Court said that, since police protection was part of the
7
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within a municipality's duties as an agent of the sovereign.
Rather, these functions are described as proprietary or private.
And we find that, with respect to these functions, municipal
corporations were at common law and are now subject to many
of the same liabilities, burdens, and responsibilities as are others
acting in proprietary capacities. They may sue or be sued with-
out consent of the legislature, just as are private businesses en-
gaged in similar activities.' If, then, municipal corporations do
not act in the capacity of the sovereign in these proprietary af-
fairs, in what capacity do they act? The answer, and the only
answer which suggests itself, is that they must act in these af-
fairs as private corporations. And if that is so, it must logically
follow that not only are municipal corporations subject to the
power of the sovereign, the employment and payment of policemen were
also part of the sovereign power. These cases seem difficult to reconcile.
Care of streets and alleys and the erection and maintenance of local
improvements have been said not to be part of the sovereign power held
by cities. Snook v. Anaconda, 26 Mont. 137, 66 P. 757 (1901) ; May v.
Anaconda, 26 Mont. 140, 66 P. 759 (1901); State eo rel. Brooks v. Cook,
84 Mont. 478, 276 P. 958 (1929) (dictum) ; Barry v. City of Butte, 115
Mont. 224, 142 P. (2d) 571 (1943). But the majority opinion in a re-
cent case, Dietrich v. Deerlodge ...... Mont ...... , 218 P. (2d) 708 (1950),
said that the surfacing and care of city streets Is a part of the State's
sovereign power to establish and maintain highways. A specially con-
curring opinion of Chief Justice Adair, following the previous cases,
stated that alleys and streets are matters of strictly municipal concern
but the financing thereof is a governmental act. This last case casts
considerable doubt upon the classification of this function.
'oCampbell v. City of Helena supra, note 32; Safransky v. City of Helena
98 Mont. 456, 39 P. (2d) 644 (1935) ; Griffith v. City of Butte supra,
note 32; Felton v. City of Great Falls 8supra, note 37. Montana counties
also have been held subject to suit for the torts of their officers and em-
ployees when acting in proprietary functions. Johnson v. City of Bil-
lings, 100 Mont. 462, 54 P. (2d) 1068 (1936) (where a city and a county
were held jointly liable) ; Jacoby v. Chouteau County, 112 Mont. 70,
112 P. (2d) 1068 (1941), citing the Johnson case as controlling. How-
ever, the decisions were based upon a very broad construction of R.C.M.
1935, § 4444 (R.C.M. 1947, § 16-804) which gives counties the power to
sue and be sued, and the court, in the Johnson case, recognized that
but for this statute it could not entertain the suit.
It is submitted that the holdings of the two cases just mentioned do
not in any way weaken the argument that since municipal corporations
may be sued without any such statute, they must have been intended
to be treated as private corporations when acting in proprietary affairs.
See Kline, Municipal Corporations: Liability of Counties for Negli-
gent Acts and Omissions of Their Employees and Officers, 3 MONT. L.
REv. 128 (1942). The author there apparently did not recognize the
statutory basis for suits against counties. McElwain in State Immunity
From Tort Liability, 8 MONT. L. REV. 45 (1947), asserts that the sover-
eign's immunity from suit is a feudal holdover and should be done
away with, but he recognizes that the change must come through legis-
lative action in the way of consent statutes.
8
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burdens imposed upon private corporations but are also entitled
to all the rights, privileges, and immunities accorded private cor-
porations. This precisely is what Judge Cooley said in dictum
in his opinion in People v. Detroit :'1
"The constitutional principle that no person shall be de-
prived of property without due process of law applies to
artificial persons as well as natural, and to municipal
corporations in their private capacities, as well as to
corporations for manufacturing and commercial pur-
poses."
And this is precisely what the Montana court held in the
case of State ex rel. Missoula v. Holmes.-
The Holmes case was the first Montana case which held in-
valid legislative interference in municipal affairs and which hold-
ing cannot be explained by any express constitutional limitation
specifically directed against legislative interference with mu-
nicipal affairs. The Steele and the Edwards cases," dis-
cussed the private corporation theory and the reserved right
theory of inherent local self government and quoted Judge Coo-
ley's dictum in People v. Detroit, and seemed to approve
both. But, as before stated, the decisions went off on express
constitutional limitations relating to municipal corporations."
The issue in the Holmes case was the constitutionality of a
statute (since defeated on referendum) requiring all political
subdivisions to insure their public buildings with the state." The
court considered no less than seven contentions made against
the validity of the statute, but rejected every one and said the
statute was valid so far as it related to counties and other political
subdivisions. However, as it applied to cities, the court said
this:
I"... If the city when acting in its proprietary capacity
is subject to the burdens, responsibilities, and liabilities
... of others acting in proprietary capacities, it must
logically follow that when acting in such a capacity it is
entitled to the rights, privileges, and immunities ac-
corded others."
The court then quoted as controlling, Cooley's dictum in
People v. Detroit," which said that the municipal corpora-
tion is protected in its proprietary affairs by the due process
"Supra, note 23 at 28 Mich. 240.
"Supra, note 36.
"Supra, notes 27, 30.
"Supra, pp. 48 and 49.
"R.C.M. 1935, § 173.2.
OSupra, note 23.
9
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clause." The Holmes case was reaffirmed later in the same year
in the case of State ex rel. Kern v. Arnold," and as late as 1949
in dictum." Thus, we find that Montana recognizes a doctrine
of inherent local self government based upon the private cor-
poration theory.
Of course, constitutions must be read as legal documents,
and effect cannot be given to the intent of the framers unless
that intent can fairly be found in the words used.' The questions
are whether the due process clause was intended to apply to
municipal corporations when acting in proprietary affairs, and
whether that intent can be found in the language used by the
framers.
Several principles of construction must be observed: the
meaning of the constitution was fixed when it was adopted; the
object of construction is to give effect to the intent of the people
who adopted the writing; the whole instrument must be examined
with a view to arriving at the true intention of each part; if
possible, the court must construe the provisions to give each
word some meaning; if words of art are used, it is presumed that
they were employed in their technical sense." With these in
mind, we now turn to the solution of the questions raised.
First, we find in various places in the Montana Constitution
reference to municipal corporations.' The word "corporation,"
in the law, has a special meaning. It is a word of art. It con-
notes the binding together of a bundle of rights and powers into
a separate artificial person. The framers of our constitution
chose to use this technical word to distinguish a particular type
of local subdivision. They must have intended to give the type
called "municipal corporations" separate treatment,' and they
must be presumed to have used the word "corporation" in its
technical sense. Article XV, Section 18, states"... ; and all cor-
"Montana Constitution, Art. III, § 27.8100 Mont. 346, 49 P. (2d) 976, 100 A.L.R. 1071 (1935).
"Lindeen v. Montana State Liquor Control Board, 122 Mont. 549, 207 P.
(2d) 977 (1949).
5"COOLEY'S CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONs, (8th ed. 1927) p. 124.
'Id., pp. 124-132.
"Art. V, §§ 26, 39; Art. XII, § 2; Art. VIII, § 6; Art. XVI, § 6; Art.
XIII, § 4. R.C.M. 1947, § 16-801; R.C.M. 1935, § 4441, also states that
counties are "bodies corporate" but those words are used in a limited
sense and only for certain purposes set forth in the section itself. "Body
corporate" as there used means only that for those purposes the county
may act as a unit though still as an agent of the state. School dis.
tricts are also "bodies corporate," R.C.M. 1947, § 75-1803; R.C.M. 1935,§ 1022.
"Hersey v. Nielson, supra, note 1.
10
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porations shall have the right to sue and shall be subject to be
sued in all courts in like cases as natural persons. . . ." (Em-
phasis supplied.) The word "corporation" is not qualified.
Couple all this with the fact that local self government ex-
isted in England and the Colonies before there ever was a state
constitution, and with the fact that municipal corporations were
and are regularly subjected to the burdens and liabilities of pri-
vate persons engaged in similar proprietary affairs, and it is
fairly inferable from the language used that the framers in-
tended to protect municipal corporations in those affairs as
private corporations.
In summary, local self government in municipal corpora-
tions is socially and economically desirable and is a character-
istic mark of English and American democracy. Some states
have expressly provided for a right to local self government by
amendment to their constitutions, but on sound legal principles
there is no room for a theory of a reserved right existing inde-
pendently of such express constitutional provision. However,
another theory of local self government has been adopted by a
few jurisdictions which, though more limited, is sound on legal
principles. It is that municipalities, when acting in proprietary
or private matters, are protected as private corporations by the
due process clauses of the state constitutions. Montana has not
only given verbal approval to this theory but has actually de-
cided cases on the basis of it. There can be no doubt now but
that the Montana Supreme Court will hold invalid any legisla-
tive interference in municipal affairs which would be a violation
of due process if municipalities were ordinary private corpora-
tions acting in a similar activity.
It is submitted that the position of the Montana Supreme




Res ipsa loquitur, literally translated, means "the thing
speaks for itself." The courts in deciding cases often quote and
refer to this literal translation.' Shortly, attorneys refer to it
'Johnson v. Herring, 89 Mont. 420, 300 P. 535 (1931) ; Maki v. Murray
Hospital, 91 Mont. 521, 7 P. (2d) 228 (1932) ; Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey v. Midgett, 116 F. (2d) 562 (1941) ; Cunningham v. Dady, 191
N.Y. 152, 83 N.E. 689 (1908) ; Morner v. Union Pac. R. Co., 196 P. (2d)
744 (1948).
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